The «mind-body» problem: from cartesian dualism to brain death criteria in transplantology

Abstract

Our purpose is to show the relevance and organic self-realization of Descartes’ concepts in a context more appropriate for solving the «mindbody» problem, that is, in transplantology, where the ideas of human reducing to brain death, thinking things, dualism, and the body-machine, are realized than for the one-sided context of neurosciences. The theses are based on the works of Descartes, Damasio, works on bioethics. The scientific novelty is that for the first time we determined the conceptual similarity of Descartes' philosophy and transplantology: the criterion for death in transplantology (Cartesian reduction) for the whole human is brain death (Cogito, ergo sum – I think, therefore, I am) in two protocols (Harvard and Pittsburgh), the bodymachine, the dualism of body and soul, a thinking thing. We conclude that the neuro-context is limited, one-sided for solving the «mind-body» problem when referring to the philosophy of Descartes. Placing the philosophy of Descartes in a different context – transplantology – shows the relevance of the ideas of human reduction to the brain death, thinking things, dualism, and the body-machine, and implements them.